

The  
**VIRTUAL MUSEUM**  
of the  
**LANCASHIRE & YORKSHIRE RAILWAY**

Accident Reports.

8 July 1867

BoT Report into Accident at  
Manchester Victoria.

(2 Pages).

is a general remark that could not be intended to bear a practical deduction, since such is not expressed.

He remarks that the ganger, i.e. Carty, had no level. The rule on this railway is, that the overlooker, but not the ganger, should have one. Cosgrave was overlooker in this case, and produced his level when asked for it by Colonel Yolland.

Cosgrave has, in our opinion, by his carelessness, proved himself unfit for such responsibility as lies with a man entrusted with relaying. We do not think Carty is nearly so much to blame, though the prevarication and deception of the two admit of no excuse.

COTTON and FLEMING.

5th September 1867.

*Board of Trade  
(Railway Department),*

SIR, *Whitehall, 19th September 1867.*

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, enclosing a copy of observations by the consulting engineers of the Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Company, on Colonel Yolland's report on the accident to a passenger train at Bray Head on the 9th ultimo.

In reply I am to transmit to you to be laid before the Directors of your Company, the enclosed copy of a memorandum on the subject by Colonel Yolland, to whom your communication was referred.

I am, &c.

*The Secretary of the  
Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford  
Railway Company.* R. G. W. HERBERT.

Copy of Colonel YOLLAND'S MEMORANDUM.

THE only important point on which Messrs. Cotton and Fleming appear to differ from me has reference to the steps which have hitherto, and apparently will in future be taken in maintaining the permanent way of this railway.

As already stated, I observed that many of the longitudinal timbers were seriously decayed. Mr. Fogerty calls attention to one at the joint (*n*) where the flange of the rail was fractured, and where he thinks the engine got off the line; another could be seen on the viaduct itself, which had been strengthened by a piece of timber placed on each side, with bolts through the rotten longitudinal, and I considered, and still entertain the same opinion, that when a line is in the condition in which I found portions between Bray Head and station, new rails—admitted to be necessary—should be laid on new sleepers, and not on decayed or partially decayed longitudinals, and that it would have been better to have made a complete renewal than to have introduced pieces of patch-work.

I have not stated that the accident was caused by the decayed timbers, but I infer that it was due to the bad state of the permanent way. It matters little as far as the public are concerned whether this condition was occasioned by bad workmanship or by defective materials.

W. YOLLAND.

14th September 1867.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

*Board of Trade  
(Railway Department),  
Whitehall, 15th August 1867.*

SIR, I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred on the 8th ultimo in the Victoria Station at Manchester of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

My Lords trust that the directors will give their careful consideration to Captain Tyler's recommendations.

I am, &c.

*The Secretary of the  
Lancashire and Yorkshire  
Railway Company.* R. G. W. HERBERT.

*Walton-on-the-Naze,  
10th August 1867.*

SIR, IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 13th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the 8th ultimo between a passenger train entering, and a waggon standing in, the Victoria Station at Manchester, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

This station, at which the traffic is enormous, is approached, as I have had occasion to explain on previous occasions, on a steep falling gradient for about a mile from Miles Platting. It has been the practice with certain of the branch passenger trains to bring them nearly or quite to a stand about 120 yards from the entrance to the station; to detach the engine by a treadle, connected with the coupling, and

acted upon by the guard in the leading van; and to allow the engine and train to run forward into the station on different lines. This operation, which is a mode of "fly shunting," is attended with much convenience, as the engine is ready immediately to proceed to the other end of the train, and to start with it again in the opposite direction; and it is especially convenient at this particular station because the amount of accommodation is limited in proportion to the traffic. There are not spare lines available for allowing the engines, if they were taken into the station at the head of their trains, to run round them in all cases in the *dock* lines between the platforms. The delay and risk which would be caused by backing these trains out of the station after their arrival, for the purpose of getting the engine round them, would be so great as to render such a mode of working impracticable. But it has its disadvantages as regards safety; and, indeed, any system of fly shunting with passenger trains is, as a general rule, objectionable. The passenger carriages of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Company are, however, supplied with break power more efficiently than those of any other Company; and if all the trains were brought actually to a stand near the foot of the incline before being allowed to enter the station, there would be an important element of safety in that precaution, whether the uncoupling took place or not.

The above fly-shunting process is not adopted with the main-line trains from Yorkshire, but with the following numbers of branch trains from the different places enumerated:—

10	trains	from	Middleton.
11	"	"	Staleybridge.
26	"	"	Oldham.
11	"	"	Bury.
7	"	"	Rochdale.

making altogether 65 branch trains daily.

The 10.10 a.m. passenger train from Middleton left

that station punctually for Manchester on the 8th July, consisting of a tank engine, three carriages, and a break-van. The carriages and van were all coupled together with Fay's continuous break, which appeared to work perfectly well at the intermediate stations. The engine-driver found, as he approached the Manchester (Victoria) station, a signal against him; and he brought his train *almost* to a stand near the usual place, 120 yards from the station. The signal having been lowered, the (acting) guard uncoupled the train from the engine with his treadle, and made a signal with his hand from the window of his van to the driver, to "go ahead." The engine went forward into a siding, and the train was turned in another direction, through a pair of facing points, to its platform line. The train, instead of being brought to a stand at its proper place, was allowed to run forward against a waggon near the stationary buffers at the end of the dock line.

Neither the spring buffers of the waggon nor the stationary buffers were damaged; but the body of a first-class passenger carriage was shifted on its framing; and eight of the passengers were, unfortunately, more or less injured.

The acting guard who was in charge of this train had been a porter in the Lancashire, and Yorkshire Company's service for two years and six months,—at Pendleton, Clifton Junction, Horwich, and Manchester. He had been in the habit of occasionally helping the foreman porter to shunt the trains at the Victoria station for three months, and had been at that station at different times altogether for 10 months. He thought he understood the action of the breaks well, from having worked them in shunting. He had done duty as second guard with trains to Blackpool and Liverpool frequently during the summer of 1866, with ordinary and excursion trains, and with a train to Sowerby Bridge on the Saturday before this collision. But these trains had, with one exception, entered the Victoria station with their engines in front of them; and the 8th July was the first day on which he had, as head guard, brought a train down the incline from Miles Platting, and in that capacity essayed the uncoupling and fly-shunting process. He left Manchester at 8.25 a.m. on that day, and returned at 9 o'clock; and it was on his second trip, in returning to Manchester about 10.30 a.m., that the above accident occurred.

Immediately after that accident he ascribed it to some defect in the breaks which he could not explain; and they were accordingly tested at once by the station master, who found them, by actual experiment, to be in good working order. But the statement which he subsequently made to me was as follows: "About 20 yards from the Scotland Street Bridge the train came almost to a stand. I unhooked the engine from the train with the treadle in my van, and gave the signal to the engine-driver to go forward. He did so. I afterwards took my break off as far as I could, to let the carriages run forward. When I tried to apply it again I found that I had turned it off too far, and I could not turn it on again, as it stuck. I put my foot to it, and used all the force I could; and I got it to work, but too late to stop the train, which ran against a waggon, and forced it against the stationary buffers. The breaks seemed to be in good order all the way from Middleton, as I worked them at the two stations—Middleton

" Junction and Miles Platting—and in pulling up " at Scotland Street Bridge."

I found by experiment that the break wheel would, when it was turned off to an unnecessary extent for two or three revolutions, and with some degree of violence, "stick," as the acting guard asserts, and that a considerable amount of force was then required to release it. This explanation of the accident is, therefore, quite within the bounds of probability; but it is strange that it was not given immediately after the accident, or until my inquiry. The acting guard accounts for not having sooner afforded it by saying that he was so much confused at the time that he hardly knew what statements he made.

This collision was, at all events, caused by some mistake on the part of a comparatively inexperienced porter, acting as head guard, in the process of fly-shunting with a passenger train. It would either not have occurred or have been less violent if the train had been brought quite to a stand before the uncoupling took place, because the line, after falling to the platform, rises slightly along the length of the platform. It was not the practice previously to bring all the trains absolutely to a stand before uncoupling the engine, and it would always be difficult to enforce this precaution. It would be better if the train were, after being brought to a stand at the Scotland Street bridge, always run into the station engine first. This might be done by employing a spare engine, ready in each case to take a train out again after its arrival, and by providing that the engine arriving with any one train should depart with the succeeding train. This, again, would necessitate a system of interchanging the engines amongst the different branch trains. At present, the engines employed ordinarily with the Staleybridge, Bury, and Rochdale trains are not sufficiently powerful to work the Oldham and Middleton traffic; but there is no good reason why the locomotive arrangements should not be made in future with a view to an alteration in this respect; and I would take the opportunity of recommending the construction of a class of engines, with double bogie-frames, and coupled wheels in each, which, being sufficiently powerful to work any of the trains, would also be of the safest description for working round sharp curves on steep gradients, and with either end first.

It will further be desirable, on discontinuing the system of fly shunting, to introduce locking apparatus into the cabins Nos. 5 and 6 near the entrance of the Victoria Station. There are in No. 5 cabin seven signal levers, nine point levers, and two bell levers; and in No. 6 cabin four signal levers, five point levers, and one bell lever. These are in constant use, and it would be a great advantage to safety to interlock these signals and points with one another, so that it may not be possible for the signalmen to lower their signals when the points are in the wrong position, or to alter the points when the signals applying to them are at "all right" or while trains are passing over them, or to lower simultaneously any two or more conflicting signals, so as to lead to a collision of engines or trains.

I have, &c.

H. W. TYLER.

*The Secretary of the  
Board of Trade,  
(Railway Department).*