

The
VIRTUAL MUSEUM
of the
LANCASHIRE & YORKSHIRE RAILWAY

Accident Reports.

28 May 1903

BoT Report into Accident at
Kirkdale.

(6 Pages).

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.,
22nd June, 1903.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the Order of the 2nd June, the result of my inquiry into the causes of the accident which occurred on the 28th May to an express passenger train at Kirkdale, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

In this case as the Leeds and Liverpool express which leaves Manchester at 5.30 p.m. was crossing from the down main line to the down east line at Kirkdale West signal-box, the trailing wheels of the tender and the first pair of the leading bogie wheels of the vehicle behind the tender left the rails and travelled in that position to Sandhills No. 3 signal-box.

The driver and fireman were injured by the shock, but no passengers complained of injury.

The train was composed of a ten-wheeled passenger engine, with leading bogie, four coupled wheels, two trailing radial wheels, and six-wheeled tender, with the vacuum brake on all wheels except the four bogie wheels, the brake on the tender wheels being also applied by hand; and of seven bogie vehicles, the first, fourth and last being brake vans, with the vacuum brake working on every wheel of all the vehicles.

The brakes are stated to have been in excellent order.

The accident occurred at 6.8 p.m.

Details of damage to rolling stock and permanent way are given in the Appendix.

Description.

Between Walton Junction and Kirkdale West signal-boxes there is only one up and one down line, but at Kirkdale West and beyond there are four lines of way, viz., up and down fast lines and up and down east lines. The down fast line and down east line are alone concerned in this case.

The splitting signals for the down line are on a bridge over the facing points leading from the down fast to the down east. The down fast line is quite straight, the turn out to the down east line being on a radius of $11\frac{1}{2}$ chains.

Three hundred and twenty-six yards behind Kirkdale West box is Kirkdale East box, where there are also directing signals for both down lines.

Fourteen hundred and ninety yards behind Kirkdale East box is the down starting signal of Walton Junction box, and underneath this arm and slotted by it is the distant signal arm for Kirkdale West box, which is thus 1,816 yards behind the points leading from the down main to down east line.

This arm is also slotted from Kirkdale East box, so although it can only be lowered by the signalman at Kirkdale West, it requires both the Kirkdale East down fast home signal and the Walton Junction starting signal to be lowered before it can fall into the safety position.

The lever working it in Kirkdale West cabin is so interlocked that the signal can only be lowered when the road is set for the down main line.

This distant signal is a very important one, as between Kirkdale East box and Walton Junction is a tunnel about 1,100 yards in length, so that a driver has no sight of the Kirkdale East down signals until he is almost abreast of them, and from there to the facing points at Kirkdale West is only 326 yards.

The down line from Walton Junction to Kirkdale West is on a falling gradient all the way, varying from 1 in 386 to 1 in 535, and express trains run from 60 to 70 miles an hour over it.

Evidence.

T. W. Stead, driver, states: I have been in the service since 1877, and a driver since 1894. On May 28th I signed on duty at 3 p.m., and signed off at 12.5 a.m. I had previously signed off at 12.5 a.m. the same day. I was working the 3.57 p.m. train from Leeds to Liverpool with engine No. 1407, which is a 10-wheeled passenger

express engine with leading bogie, four coupled wheels, and six-wheeled tender, with the vacuum brake on all wheels except the four bogie wheels. The brake on the tender wheels can also be applied by hand. The brakes were in good order, and I had 20 inches of vacuum. We had a clear road through Walton Junction, and at this place

the down starting signal and the distant signal for Kirkdale East, which is on the same post, were off for us. I saw the signals myself. I had steam on when we entered the tunnel, and when I emerged we should be running about 60 miles per hour. As soon as the steam cleared away I saw that the home signal at Kirkdale East box was off for us to travel on the east main line. On looking further ahead I saw the corresponding signal for Kirkdale West, which is at the Liverpool end of Kirkdale platform, also off for the east main. The distant signal underneath it was at danger. I had shut off steam just before reaching the Liverpool end of the tunnel, because we were running fast and were up to time, and sometimes we find the distant signal for Sandhills No. 3 at danger. When I saw that we were being turned on the east main I at once applied the brake very hard. This would be just after passing Kirkdale East box. I was of opinion that the engine would not round the curve, and so I applied the brake very hard, but after she had rolled about and we had got on the straight I reversed the engine and put on steam. I should think we took the curve at 50 miles an hour, and we finally came to rest with the engine just under Sandhills No. 3 home signals. When we came to a stand I found the trailing wheels of the tender and the leading bogie wheels of the coach next to it off the road. Both axle boxes of the trailing tender axle were broken. None of the engine wheels were off the road; the trailing wheels had been off, but they jumped on again. I have never seen the distant for Kirkdale East off before on the occasions I have been turned on to the east main line, and I have been turned down this road scores of times, but never before when working this particular train. I was shaken by the accident.

Frederick Alcroyd, fireman, states: I have been in the service for 10½ years, and a fireman for five years. I was fireman with driver Stead on May 28th, and signed on and off duty at the same time as he did. I was also working with him the day before. All signals were off for us to Walton Junction, and here the starting signal and the distant signal underneath it were off. On coming out of the tunnel, and before we got to the platform at Kirkdale Station, I saw the middle signal of the three home signals at the Liverpool end of the platform off. I did not see the home signals at Kirkdale East box, as I was working the sanders passing there, as we always do in this tunnel. My driver shut off steam at the Liverpool end of the tunnel. I had no conversation with any of the signalmen. I am certain the distant signal for Kirkdale East was off, and the guard told me afterwards that he also saw it off. My ribs, which had been previously injured at Mirfield, suffered from the shaking I got.

William Stephenson, guard, states: I have been in the service 28 years and a guard about 23 years. On May 28th I came on duty at 1.40 p.m. at Normanton to work until 10.45 p.m. I signed off duty the day before at 11 p.m. at Normanton. I joined the 3.57 p.m. Leeds to Liverpool train at Halifax, as guard in charge, and travelled in the rear van of the train. We were running to time up to Walton Junction. Approaching Walton Junction all signals were off. I saw the starting signal for Walton Junction with the distant signal for Kirkdale East under it from the back van window as we passed it, and at that time both these signals were off. We ran through the tunnel, and I do not know what happened after that until the brakes were put hard on just

as my van came out of the tunnel. Then we were switched round to the left after passing through Kirkdale Station. I was sitting on the right hand side of the van looking towards the engine, and did not see how any of the signals were at Kirkdale East and West. The engine came to a stand on the east main nearly opposite Sandhills No. 3 box. On walking down the train I found the engine tender and leading bogie of the first coach off the road. The train was moderately loaded. No complaints were made to me by the passengers, in fact they did not seem to know that the train was off the road. I prevented the passengers from getting out on to the adjoining main lines, and got them off the east main line into the sidings, and took them to Kirkdale Station. Some of them got on to the road at Stanley Road Bridge. I asked the signalman at Sandhills No. 3 box if the line was blocked back and he told me it was, and then I went to attend to the passengers. I asked him if the signalman at the west box knew we were off the road and he said yes. My train was fitted throughout with the vacuum brake working on every wheel. There were 20 inches of vacuum all the journey. The formation was as follows:—

Engine 1407.

Tender.

Bogie third van

Bogie third van

Bogie composite

Bogie third van

Bogie third van

Bogie composite

Bogie third van

} Harrogate to Liverpool.

} Bradford to Liverpool.

Arthur Moss, inspector, states: I am a travelling inspector attached to the passenger superintendent's trains department, and have been in the service since 1875, and an inspector since 1894. On May 28th I joined the 3.57 p.m. train, Leeds to Liverpool, at Manchester, and travelled in the rear van of the train along with guard Stephenson. I sat on the left side of the train. We were running to time up to Walton Junction. I saw the distant signal for Kirkdale East, which is under Walton Junction down starting signal, and it was off. As we were coming out of the tunnel the brake was applied hard on, and I looked through the window of the van projection and saw the engine was turning to the east main line. I did not see the signals for Kirkdale East or West. The engine came to a stand against the down home signals at Sandhills No. 3 box. I did not know any part of the train was off the road, but on going to the front I found the engine tender and leading bogie wheels of the first coach off the rails. I went at once to the signalman at No. 3 box and told him to block the road, but he stated he had already done so. I also telephoned for the tool van. No complaints were made by the passengers to me. I had no conversation with the signalman about the cause of the accident.

Richard Kirkby, telegraph linesman, states: I have been in the Company's service since 1888, and a linesman for five years. I have charge of the telegraphic appliances between Liverpool and Walton Junction. On May 2nd I examined the repeaters in connection with the signals at Kirkdale West and East, and they were then in good working order. I did not examine them after this until May 29th, when signalman Holt, at Kirkdale East box, reported that the repeater of his down distant signal was not working properly. His complaint was that the indicator was not shewing off at times when he pulled off the signal. I examined the commutator but

found nothing wrong with it, and the cause of the indicator failing to shew off was due to his wire being slack. At the same time I also examined the commutator for the indicator which works in connection with the signal in Kirkdale West box, and this was in good order. I have had no complaint from Kirkdale West box about the indicator in that box not working correctly. It would not be possible for the distant arm to be off or even drooping and the indicator in Kirkdale West box to shew on. The commutator is attached to the slot lever in the case of Kirkdale East box, and in the other case it is attached to the arm rod. I have done nothing to either of these indicators since the accident.

Edmund Holt, signalman, Kirkdale East box, states:—I have been in the service about nine years—a signalman seven years, and five years at Kirkdale East box. On May 28th I came on duty at 2 p.m. to work till 10 p.m., having finished duty the day before at 10 p.m. I received "Is line clear" signal from Walton Junction box for the 2.32 p.m. York to Liverpool at 5.57, acknowledged it same time, and received "Entering section" at 6.1. It passed me at 6.2, was acknowledged by box in advance at 5.57, and I received "Out of section" signal for it at 6.2. The next train was the 3.57 p.m. from Leeds to Liverpool, which was offered to me at 6.2, and acknowledged at same time. I received "Entering section" signal at 6.7, and it passed me at 6.9. It was acknowledged in advance at 6.2, and I received "Out of section" at 6.9. There are no distant signals for Kirkdale West box under my down home signals, but the man at West box slots the home signals. I have one lever to work two home signals, and West box determines which of the two comes off. The Leeds to Liverpool train passed me at a fast rate of speed, but only at the ordinary rate when there is a clear road. The first I heard of the accident was about five minutes after the train had passed, when the signalman at West box telephoned to me that the train had gone off the road on the east main line. He expressed surprise at the speed the train was travelling, seeing that his signal was off for the east main line. He asked me no question on the matter, and I heard no conversation on the telephone between the signalmen at West box and Walton Junction. I noticed the repeater for my down distant signal for the York train, and it was shewing off, and I saw it go on after the train had passed. I noticed it again when the Leeds train was approaching, and it came off. The indicator comes off when I pull my lever over which works the slot.

William Ward, signalman, Kirkdale West box, states: I have been in the service 11 years—a signalman for nine years, and in Kirkdale West box since the beginning of April. On May 28th I came on duty at 2 p.m. to work until 10 p.m., having gone off duty the day previously at 10 p.m. I received "Is line clear" signal for the 2.42 p.m. train, York to Liverpool, from East box at 5.56, acknowledged it same time, received "Train entering section" signal at 6.1, and it passed me at 6.1. It was accepted in advance by Sandhills No. 3 on the west main at 5.56, and I gave "Out of section" for it at 6.1, and received "Out of section" for it from Sandhills No. 3 at 6.2. The 3.57 p.m. from Leeds to Liverpool was offered to me at 6.1 and acknowledged same time. I received "Train entering section" signal for it at 6.5, and it passed me at 6.8. It was accepted in advance on the east main line at 6.5, and I gave

"Out of section" for it at 6.8, and received "Out of section" for it at 8.21 from Sandhills No. 3 box. I first offered the "Is line clear" signal for the Leeds to Liverpool train to Sandhills No. 3 box on the west main at 6.2 p.m., but the signalman there did not acknowledge it. He told me on the telephone that the York train was standing at Sandhills No. 2 home signals, and that if he did not accept the Leeds train soon on the west main to offer it again on the east main. On receipt of "Train entering section" signal at 6.5 I offered the train to Sandhills No. 3 on the east main, and he accepted it. My road was set for the west main, as I did not know at that time which line the Leeds train was to be turned on to, but on receipt of "Train entering section" signal I had to make up my mind, and on Sandhills No. 3 accepting it on the east main, I set the points for that road and pulled off my home and starting signals. My distant signal will only come off for the west main, and my indicator shewed that the signal was at danger. I am certain I put my signals to danger after the York train passed. I reversed my road from west to east main as soon as Sandhills No. 3 accepted the train, and I took off the signals for it at the same time. This was at 6.5. The train arrived at 6.8. I am positive I did not pull off my west main signals for the Leeds train and afterwards alter the road and signals. The train was travelling very fast when it passed me, probably 60 miles an hour, and I thought it was going too quickly, seeing that I had my distant at danger. The indicator had worked all right that day, and I have never had cause to complain of my signals not working properly. Immediately after the mishap I spoke to signalman Baldwin at Walton Junction, and asked him how my distant was when Leeds train passed him, and he said he did not notice it, but it was on at that time, although he had his starting signal off for a coal train which was approaching. I did not speak to the man at East box. When the train passed me at such a high rate of speed I looked at my distant repeater and it was at danger, and I then asked the man at Walton Junction. I looked at the distant repeater at the same time as I looked at the repeater for the home signal at East box when I pulled off the latter. Both repeaters are together, and the distant repeater was at danger then. I have nine levers to move to alter my road and signals from west to east main line, and I should say it would take me about 20 or 30 seconds to do this. Porter Mitchell, who was on the platform, can say that only the east main line signal was taken off for the Leeds train. The locking has always been perfect, and it has always been impossible to lower the distant for the east main line.

Edward Baldwin, signalman, Walton Junction, states: I have been in the service 28 years, and a signalman 27 years, and have been in Walton Junction box five years. On May 28th I came on duty at 2 p.m. to work until 10 p.m., having left duty 2 p.m. the day before. The distant signal for Kirkdale East and West boxes is on my down starting signal-post. I saw the starting signal and distant under it off for the York train. Both went to danger after this train passed. The Leeds express followed it, but I did not notice the distant signal for it. The driver did not whistle on approaching the signal. After the train had passed, and before I knew that an accident had happened, the man at Kirkdale West asked me to look at the distant signal. It had been working all right and it worked right afterwards. The men at West box have asked me to look at the signal on several occasions.

G. H. Boothroyd, signalman, Sandhills No. 3, states: I have been in the service 19 years, a signalman 18 years, and have been in Sandhills No. 3 box about six years. On May 28th I came on duty at 2 p.m. to work until 10 p.m.; on 27th I booked off at 10 p.m. On the afternoon in question there was an engine off the road at Liverpool and this caused a block. At 5.47 p.m. the tool-van left for Liverpool on the west main line, and then a light engine followed at 5.51. This York train was offered to me at 5.57. I acknowledged it at 5.57 and received "Entering section" signal at 6.1 and it passed me at 6.2. It was accepted in advance at 5.57, and I gave "Out of section" at 6.2 and received "Out of section" from Sandhills No. 2 at 6.7. It was standing at Sandhills No. 2 home signal when I received "Is line clear" signal at 6.2 on the west main line for the 3.57 p.m. from Leeds, but I did not acknowledge it. I called the man up at Kirkdale West and told him that the York train was standing at No. 2 home signal, and said we had better have Leeds train down the east main, and he offered it me on the east main at 6.5 and I acknowledged it at the same time, and received "Entering section" signal at 6.5. The train came to a stand with the engine just under my home signals at 6.8 p.m., and as it was approaching I saw there was something wrong, and on finding out that the train was off the road I at once telephoned to the station-master at Sandhills. I had no conversation with the signalman at Kirkdale.

Francis Mitchell, porter, Kirkdale, states: I have been in the service six months as a porter at Kirkdale. I was on the platform waiting the arrival of up trains due at 5.58 and 6.7 p.m. from Liverpool, and saw the York train go through. The main line signal at the end of the platform was off for it, and I saw it put to danger after the York train had gone. I saw the middle signal which is for the east main line come off for the Leeds train three or four minutes before the train from Liverpool came up at 6.7. The 6.7 p.m. train was running to time, and it was just leaving the station when the Leeds train went through. I did not hear any points moved when the signal was taken off for the train. I am quite sure it was the middle arm that dropped for the Leeds train. The signalman at the West box said nothing to me about the signals, but I told him the next day or day after when I was lighting up

the signals that I saw the middle arm off for the east main line for the Leeds train.

Joseph Rathbone states: I have been the district signal inspector stationed at Bank Hall and have made periodical inspections of the signalling throughout the Western Division for the last 19 years. In December last I received instructions to make a special inspection of the whole of the signals upon my district upon the course of the Liverpool and Manchester express trains. I made the first special inspection throughout the whole length from Ellesmere Colliery siding to Liverpool Exchange on January 9th, and in the course of the inspection tested the working of the signals at Kirkdale East and West boxes. Subsequently I tested the working of the signals at Kirkdale on April 18th and May 18th, and on each occasion tested the down distant signal for Kirkdale West box. I found it working satisfactorily each time and the repeater correctly indicating the state of the signal. Since May 18th I have been several times in Kirkdale West box and have noticed the working of the signal and the repeater in connection, which has always appeared satisfactory. The interlocking in Kirkdale West box is so arranged that the down distant signal can be lowered for the main (West) line only. The morning after the accident I visited the signal-box and tested the locking upon the distant signal which I found to be correct. It was quite impossible to lower it when the facing points were set for the East line.

Henry Howard states: I have been in the Company's service 21 years, and signal chieftain for three-and-a-half years on the District from Ormskirk to Walton Junction. The main line distant under Walton Junction down starter comes under my supervision. On the 27th May last I examined, cleaned and overhauled the whole of the appliances attached to this post, from the signal arms to the balance levers and pulleys underneath. I found them in good working order and cleaned and oiled them and left them working all right. I have had no complaint whatever about this signal not working properly. After the cleaning and oiling I gave them on the 27th May I do not think the distant arm could possibly stick off. I examine and clean and oil these signals once a week.

Conclusion.

As will be seen from the evidence, this derailment was due to the excessive speed at which the train was running at the sharp crossing from the down fast line to the down east line at Kirkdale West signal-box. The radius of the curve of the crossing is only $11\frac{1}{2}$ chains, and the driver states that he was running at least 50 miles an hour at the time, so the wonder is that the engine did not burst the road, and the whole train become derailed with serious results.

The driver was justified in running at this high speed if the distant signal for Kirkdale West box was lowered when he passed it, as the lever working it is so interlocked that it can only be pulled off when the road is set for the main line, and when the main line home signals at Kirkdale West and East boxes and the starting signal at Walton Junction are lowered. Driver Stead states that this distant signal was lowered for him, and in this he is supported by his fireman Akroyd, by the guard Stephenson, and by inspector Moss who was travelling in the guard's van at the rear of the train.

Seven minutes previously the York express had passed on the main line with all signals off for it, and signalman Ward at Kirkdale West states that the repeater showed that the distant signal had gone to danger when he put back his lever, and signalman Baldwin at Walton Junction states that he saw the distant signal go to danger when he put back his starting signal to danger, after the York train had passed.

As soon as the York express had passed Kirkdale West at 6.1 p.m., signalman Ward was offered the Leeds express and he at once accepted it and offered it to the box in advance (Sandhills No. 3) at the same time, but it was not acknowledged, and the signalman there told Ward on the telephone that the York train was standing at No. 2 box home signals on the main line, and that if he did not soon accept the Leeds train on the main line to offer it to him on the east line. Accordingly when at 6.5 Ward received "train entering section" for the Leeds express, he offered it to Sandhills No. 3 on the east line and it was accepted, and he states he then set his road (which was then standing for the main line) for the east line, and lowered his home signal for the east line. The distant signal, as before stated, cannot be lowered when the road is set for the east line. This was three minutes before the Leeds train arrived, and Ward is supported in his statement that the signal was off for the east line for that period before the Leeds train arrived by porter Mitchell. That being so, it was impossible for Ward to have pulled the lever working the down distant signal, and which should accordingly have been at danger when the Leeds train passed it.

The time the Leeds express would take to run the distance, 1,816 yards from the distant signal to the crossing, at 65 miles an hour would be only 57 seconds, so under these circumstances even if Ward had first lowered the signals for the main line by mistake, and then changed them for the east line, three minutes before the train arrived, the driver would still have found the distant signal at danger when he passed it only 57 seconds before reaching Kirkdale West box.

The distant signal and its appliances were all cleaned and oiled the day before the derailment occurred, and it had never been known to stick off or not to work properly, and it was found to be working properly immediately after the derailment occurred.

I think the evidence is conclusive as to the distant signal being in the "off" position when the Leeds train passed it, as the driver, fireman, guard, and the traffic inspector who was riding in the rear van, all state positively that it was in that position. The interlocking of the levers in the signal-box is correct, so it was impossible for Ward to have pulled his distant signal lever when he set the road and lowered the signals for the east line on which the Leeds train was to travel.

As already stated, there is the independent evidence of Mitchell supporting Ward's statement that the east line signal was lowered for three minutes before the Leeds train arrived, so Ward could not have changed the road and signals after the train had passed the distant signal.

There remains the question of the distant signal, or some part of the mechanism and wire by which it is operated, sticking in the off position after the York train had passed. There is no doubt that the semaphore arm itself did not stick off after the passing of the York train, as all the signalmen concerned state positively that it went to danger. But it is possible that when Ward at Kirkdale West box put back the lever working the distant signal in the frame that the long lead of wire got caught up, and that the part of the mechanism on the signal post operated by that lever also remained in the off position. Ward's repeater would show the signal arm as being at danger because the arm would already have gone to that position when the Walton Junction starting signal was put to danger behind the York train, and the repeater in the West box shows the position of the signal arm itself, and not of the part of the mechanism controlling the arm worked from the West box. Assuming this part of the mechanism did not respond to the lever working it from Kirkdale West box, then when Walton Junction starting signal and the slot on the down distant worked from Kirkdale East box were pulled off for the Leeds train, the result would be that the distant signal would fall into the off position, although the lever controlling it from Kirkdale West box had not been pulled over in the frame, but the repeater in the West box would show that it was in the off position. Thus, when Ward set the road and lowered his home signal for the east line, it was possible for the distant signal to have been in the off position instead of at danger as it should have been. But Ward states in his evidence that when he pulled off his home and starting signals for the Leeds train 3 minutes before it arrived that his repeater showed that the down distant arm was at danger. If this evidence is correct then unless Ward pulled off his home signal before the men at Kirkdale East and Walton Junction pulled their distant and starting levers respectively for the Leeds train, the assumption that part of the mechanism stuck off after the passing of the York train is incorrect, or else the Leeds train had already passed the distant signal, and that signal had gone to danger again with the Walton Junction starting signal when Ward lowered his home signal. In the latter case the train would have arrived in at least 50 seconds.

whereas Mitchell's evidence is to the effect that the West box home signal for the east line was lowered for 3 minutes before the Leeds train passed.

Having regard to all the evidence, I am unable to come to any definite conclusion as to how the distant signal came to be "off" for the train in question.

Two additional lines are now being constructed from Walton Junction to Kirkdale West, and the signalling will be re-arranged in consequence, but I think the Company might at once arrange for the signalman at Kirkdale West to control the down distant signal electrically and not to work it mechanically, so that the long lead of wire through the tunnel from Kirkdale West box may be avoided, and the chance of the arm sticking off done away with, which is most desirable in view of the great importance of this signal.

I have, &c.,

E. DRUITT,

Major, R.E.

The Assistant Secretary,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

APPENDIX.

DAMAGE TO ROLLING STOCK.

No. 2,988 Bogie Third Van.—1 end panel, beading, 1 door pillar, 1 waist panel, 2 door panels, and 3 bottom foot boards damaged, and 1 top foot board broken.

Damage to Permanent Way.

182 sleepers and 623 chairs had to be replaced.

Printed copies of the above Report were sent to the Company on the 24th July.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE AND LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN JOINT RAILWAYS.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.,
May 2nd, 1903.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with your Order of the 18th April, the result of my inquiry into the causes of the collision which occurred on the 13th April between a passenger train and a stop-block at Talbot Road, Blackpool, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire and London and North-Western Joint Railways.

In this case, as the London and North-Western 8.54 p.m. return excursion train from Blackpool to Greenfield was travelling on the up excursion loop line it ran past the signals at the junction of the loop line with the main line at No. 1 Talbot Road signal-box, along No. 1 shunting neck, and collided with the stop-block at the end of the neck.

The driver of the train was killed and four passengers and the fireman were injured, but none seriously.

The stop-block was carried away for about 20 yards, when the engine ran into a bank; the tender turned over on to the top of the engine and the van behind mounted the tender. The next vehicle was off the rails, but the four rear vehicles remained on the rails. The engine was a six-wheels-coupled special tender engine with brake blocks on the six coupled wheels and six tender wheels worked by the automatic vacuum brake, and with a hand-brake on the six tender wheels.

The vehicles in succession from the engine were as follows:—

							Wheels.
Brake van	6
Corridor third	8
Corridor third	8
Corridor third	8
Radial composite	8
Corridor composite brake	8