

The
VIRTUAL MUSEUM
of the
LANCASHIRE & YORKSHIRE RAILWAY

Accident Reports.

8 July 1859

BoT Report into Accident at
Salford Junction.

(2 Pages).

one needle were expressly retained for the service of each line of way, and if the west signalman were, for instance, upon receiving notice from the east signalman of a train entering from the east, to fasten the proper needle over to "line blocked," until it passed out again at the west, and *vice versa*. The men would not then have to trust to their memories, but simply to ring their bells, and work their instruments, upon the ingress and egress of the trains; and they would have always under their eyes a constant indication of the line being either clear or obstructed, which would render any mistake, both less likely, and less excusable, than under the present system. An extra needle would probably, however, be in that case required, to indicate the description of train to be expected, in consequence of there being a junction at the east end of the tunnel.

The entries in the record book of the east signalman in regard to the three trains above alluded to are as follows:—

	Telegraphed	
	Into Tunnel.	Out of Tunnel.
Leeds Train - - - -	3·32	3·34
First Bradford Train - - -	3·35	3·37
Second Bradford Train - - -	3·38	—

It takes a train, apparently, from two to two and a quarter minutes to proceed through the tunnel, when it has not been stopped at the east end; but when a train has been so stopped, about three minutes are occupied by it, in the general way, in passing through. Supposing the second train to have entered the tunnel at 3·35, therefore, which it probably may have done, if the first train, which was not stopped at the tunnel mouth, entered at 3·32, that second train could hardly have reached the other end at 3·37 under any circumstances; and that it did not do so is certain, because it was run into at 200 yards from the west end of the tunnel. It is probable, also, that the third train entered the tunnel *before* 3·38, because, if the second train passed in at 3·35, it must have been about 3·38,

or not far from that time, when the third train ran into it.

The second train was a light one as well as the third train, the former consisting of an engine and tender, three carriages, and a van, and the latter conveying two empty carriages to Low Moor. There must have been a considerable difference in their speed through the tunnel, though, of course, the precise difference cannot be ascertained. The driver of the third train states that his speed did not exceed 30 miles an hour. This is, probably, a good deal under the mark, though no blame can attach to him in that respect, because he had every right to believe that there could be nothing else before him in the tunnel.

It is singular, if it be true, that these two signalmen should have had no previous misunderstandings or difficulties during the five years that they have been working together at their respective posts; and that the two cases to which I have had occasion to allude, should then have followed so closely upon one another. From these instances it would appear, however, that the Great Northern signalman ought not longer to remain in a situation in which the careful performance of his duties is of so much importance to the public safety.

I have, &c.

The Secretary,
Railway Department,
Board of Trade.

H. W. TYLER,
Captain, R.E.

MEMORANDUM TO WAKEFIELD.

Sir,
Low Moor Station, May 14, 1859.
Holroyd, signalman at this end of Bowling tunnel, complains that the Leeds goods train was allowed to come through yesterday morning at 2·40 A.M. without being signalled, he knew nothing about a train being in the tunnel until he saw it; I would have reported this to you yesterday, but I thought it would be better to make some inquiries, and I think that this case will show that the time-book kept at the other end of the tunnel is not to be relied upon. Mitchell, driver, and Whitehead, guard, state that they left Leeds at 1·45 a.m., when they got to Bowling tunnel the signals were both standing off, they arrived here about 2·42 a.m., the watchman here books them away at 2·50 a.m.; Holroyd states that the train passed him at 2·40 a.m., I went to the other end to look at his book, and I found it there entered in at 2·3 a.m., and given out at 2·6 a.m., a difference of 34 minutes, and according to his entering only gives the train 18 minutes to run from Leeds to the tunnel. I do not know how this man can account for the junction signals standing off, for the train not being given in, and 34 minutes difference of time.

Your obedient Servant,

Capt. Binstead, R.N.,
Superintendent.

R. TODD.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, August 1, 1859.

SIR,
I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Colonel Yolland, R.E., the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred to a passenger train belonging to the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company on the 8th ultimo at the Salford junction.

My Lords direct me to state that they trust the suggestions of Colonel Yolland will receive the careful consideration of the directors.*

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company. DOUGLAS GALTON,
Captain R.E.

* Similar letter addressed to the London and North-Western Railway Company.

Stoke, near Devonport,
July 25, 1859.

SIR,
I HAVE to acquaint you for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, of the result of my inquiry, made in pursuance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 12th instant, into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 8th instant to a passenger train belonging to the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, at the Salford junction. No person was hurt.

The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company's Bolton branch, joins the London and North-Western, Manchester and Liverpool Branch, at the Salford Junction, and the line between the junction and Victoria Station Manchester, belongs to, and is maintained by the London and North-Western Railway Company.

The signals mid points at the junction are worked from a stage over the line, the pointsman standing somewhere about 20 feet immediately above the rails. The floor of the stage is boarded so that the pointsman, a servant of the London and North-Western Railway Company, cannot see whether the points are properly closed. They are weighted to stand open

for the straight line to Liverpool, and are obliged to be pulled over, when a train belonging to the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company passes by the line towards Bolton, which curves to the right.

It appears perfectly certain, that, as the 9h. 5m. A.M. down passenger train, passed over these facing-points towards Bolton, the engine struck the tongue of the left point rail, and it is surmised that the leading wheels dropped on to the Liverpool road, while the driving and trailing wheels took the Bolton road, and after running a short distance, the engine, tender, and six or seven vehicles of the eight which composed the train, got off the rails, and the engine was stopped at about 90 yards from the points. The tender and carriages, it is thought, took the Bolton road, and one or two of them remained on the rails.

The road was examined immediately after the accident, and it was evident that the tongue of the left point rail had been struck, both point rails were slightly bent, and the two chairs close to the heels of the fished joints were broken. The connecting rod next the tongues of the points was broken, and the other, near the heel, was bent.

The chair at the tongue of the left point rail had been broken some days before, but it was still secured by two spikes at the outside and one at the inside of the rail; the state of this chair does not appear to have exercised any influence in causing the accident.

Two chairs were broken on the right side of the rail adjacent to the point rail, and one in the next, and marks of the wheel were apparent on the wood keys of the chairs at the left rail of the Bolton line 12 yards from the points; two chairs of the first crossing, 37 yards from the points were also broken, and at the opposite side, the end of the guard rail had been struck; the chairs at the next crossing of the left rail of the Bolton down road with the right rail of the Liverpool up road were also broken, and two lengths of rails on the right side of the Liverpool down road, and some of the Liverpool up road were torn out and many chairs were broken.

The driver states, that he thinks he was not running more than six or eight miles an hour, when he felt the engine strike the points, and that he immediately shut off the steam, reversed the engine, and put on

the steam the reverse way; sounded the whistle for the guards breaks, and the fireman put on the tender break.

The accident was evidently caused by the pointsman not having quite closed the points prior to the engine passing over them, and he states that he had a foot in each stirrup for lowering the signals for an up and a down train on the Bolton line, at the same time that he pulled the points over for the down train to pass, and that he was not conscious that the points were not closed all the time he held them.

I examined the points and the road accompanied by the superintendent of the western division of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, when I made my inquiry on the 14th instant, and I went to the spot a second time with the station master of the Victoria Station, (London and North-Western Railway) that he might see their state.

I found that the points worked exceedingly hard, and not as freely and smoothly as they should do, so that I could not tell whether they were quite closed or not. It required all one's force to close them. I was told that the points had always been hard to work, from the time they were first erected. The pointsman who held them when the accident occurred was a very experienced man and has been employed there from the first.

The road also at the points was not in good order, but required to be properly packed.

Now as upwards of 100 engines or trains, pass daily along this down road, and over these facing points, it is of great importance that the apparatus for working these points should be altered and improved, so as to give the pointsman a fair chance of doing his duty in an efficient manner, and thus avoid accidents. The flooring of the stage should also be cut away to allow him to see the points during the day, and an indicator be put up, working on the stage above, to show him that they are closed at night, and I beg to recommend that the attention of the directors of the London and North-Western Railway Company should be called to the subject.

I have, &c.

Captain Galton, R.E.,
&c. &c.

W. YOLLAND,
Colonel, R.E.

LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, July 15, 1859.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., of his enquiry into the circumstances attending the collision which occurred on the 18th ult. at the Heaton Norris Station of the London and North-Western Railway.

My Lords trust that the inspecting officer's recommendations will be followed as to proper arrangements being made at the junction for the points and signals, and as to the supply of additional break power for goods trains.

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the London and North-Western Railway Company.
DOUGLAS GALTON,
Captain, R.E.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, July 3, 1859.*

SIR,

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 18th ultimo, near

the Heaton Norris Station of the London and North-Western Railway.

This station is half a mile to the north of Stockport, and a little to the south of the junction between the lines from Manchester and Guide Bridge. The Guide Bridge Branch runs down upon this junction on a gradient of 1 in 200, half a mile long, followed by a gradient of 1 in 140, also descending towards it, for three quarters of a mile further, and round a curve of twelve chains radius. The junction signal for the branch is seen for nearly half a mile, and the distant signal, which is 620 yards from it, is visible for a greater distance.

On the day in question, an excursion train from Guide Bridge to Liverpool, consisting of an engine and tender, twenty-six carriages, and two break vans, and containing about 1,000 passengers, came into collision with some empty salt waggons which were standing on the main line, with considerable violence; and about thirty of the excursionists were unfortunately more or less injured.

The excursion train left Guide Bridge at 5.20, twenty minutes after the hour indicated by the time bills, and ran down upon the junction without stopping, at an average speed of nearly thirty miles an hour. The driver found the distant signal from the junction at "caution,"—which was a simple intimation to proceed, inasmuch as that signal is never lowered to "all right,"—and the main junction signal at