

The
VIRTUAL MUSEUM
of the
LANCASHIRE & YORKSHIRE RAILWAY

Accident Reports.

6 August 1875

BoT Report into Accident at
Bolton.

(2 Pages).

that the driver and guard of the regular train should have these crossing orders, as the servants of the special train. In the present instance, the collision would, no doubt, have been saved, had this been done. Rule 10 provides for such a safeguard in the case of the alteration of the crossing places of regular trains; and it would seem equally necessary where an

unusual crossing has to take place between a regular and special train.

I have, &c.,
The Secretary, C. S. HUTCHINSON,
 (Railway Department,) Lieut.-Col. R.E.
Board of Trade. and Colonel.

Printed copies of the above report were sent to the Company on the 27th September.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade,
 (Railway Department.)

Sm, Whitehall, August 31st, 1875.

In compliance with the instructions contained in the order of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred on the 6th instant, at the east end of Bolton station-yard on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

A passenger train from Liverpool ran into an empty engine which was on the main line. Twelve passengers, the guard and fireman of the passenger train, and the fireman of the empty engine are reported to have been hurt, but their injuries are believed to be slight.

There are two signal-cabins at the east of Bolton station. The first is called Bury junction cabin, and the second, which is at the east end of the yard, is called Burnden junction cabin. These cabins are about $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile apart. The signals and points in both are interlocked, and are worked in connection with each other. The railway between these cabins is worked on the permissive block principle.

On the night in question two engines arrived at Bury junction, and were sent forward to Burnden junction for the purpose of being turned into the shed close to that junction. The signalman at Bury junction gave notice to the signalman at Burnden junction of the departure of these two engines, and the latter accepted them. They arrived in due course at Burnden junction, and the first engine was allowed by the signalman stationed there to go through the points and back into the engine-shed sidings. At this time the signalman at Burnden junction received telegraphic notice of the passenger train from Liverpool, which was due to leave Bolton at 10.5 p.m., but which was three minutes late. He lowered his junction signals for the passenger train to approach, thinking at the time, that he had passed the two engines into the engine-shed, whereas he had only passed one. The engine-driver of the empty engine that was standing on the line, observed the passenger train coming, and started his engine, which was running at a speed of three or four miles an hour when it was overtaken and run into by the passenger train, at a speed of 15 miles an hour.

Printed copies of the above report were sent to the Company on the 23rd September.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Sm, Brighouse, August 27th, 1875.

In compliance with the instructions contained in the order of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred on the 12th instant at Waterhouse siding, near Elland, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

On the day in question, a goods train from Manchester, which consisted of an engine and tender, 27 loaded waggons, and a break-van with a guard at

the tail of the train, was stopped by the signalman at Waterhouse siding, and put across from the down to the up-road, so as to allow an express goods train to pass.

The signals and points at Waterhouse siding are arranged on the locking principle, so that the signalman could not put the goods train across without putting his signals to danger. The railway is worked on the absolute block principle.

The up distant-signal, which is about 950 yards from the signal-cabin, could not be seen by the signalman at

I have, &c.,
The Secretary, F. H. RICH,
 (Railway Department,) Colonel R.E.
Board of Trade.

the time, owing to intervening trees, but it was provided with an electric repeater. It appears that although the signalman put this up distant-signal to danger for the protection of the goods train, that the distant-signal did not go to danger, and the man failed to observe the repeater, which would have distinctly shown him that his distant-signal had not acted properly. While the goods train was standing on the up-line, about 190 yards inside the up home-signal, a fish train, which consisted of an engine and tender, five loaded waggons, and a van, with a compartment for the mails, in which two post office men were travelling, and a break compartment with the guard, arrived from Normanton. The engine-driver of this fast fish train found the Waterhouse siding up distant-signal at all-right, and he continued to run forward at the speed of about 40 miles an hour. The morning was thick, owing to the mist rising from the valley, and he did not see the home-signal, which was at danger, until he got close to it. He appears only to have had time to shut off steam and whistle for the guard's break before his engine ran into the engine of the goods train, at a speed of about 30 miles an hour.

The engine-driver of the fish train remained on his engine; he was a good deal hurt and scalded, and could not appear before me to give his evidence. The fireman of the fish train jumped off and was slightly bruised. The guard of this train and one of the post office sorters were also injured. The driver, fireman, and guard of the goods train got off their train when they saw that the collision was about to occur.

Three of the waggons of the fish train and four waggons of the goods train were thrown off the rails and broken, and both engines were damaged.

The accident was caused by the signalman at Waterhouse siding failing to observe the repeater to the distant-signal, and consequently not being aware that the signal had not gone to danger, when he pulled the lever to its proper place. The distant-signal has since been removed to a position clear of the trees, where no repeater is required.

I have, &c.,

F. H. RICH,

Colonel R.E.

*The Secretary,
(Railway Department),
Board of Trade.*

Printed copies of the above report were sent to the Company on the 18th September.

LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

Sir,

Leeds, August 24th, 1875.

In compliance with the instructions contained in the Order of the 24th of June, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the accident that occurred at the Canal junction, near Leeds, on the 19th of June. Two passengers have complained of being hurt. The damage to the permanent way and rolling stock was slight.

The part of the railway where the accident happened belongs to the London and North-Western and North-Eastern Railway Companies conjointly. On the date in question, the passenger-train, which consisted of an engine and tender, three third-class, three composites, two third-class carriages, and a break-van with the guard in charge (coupled together in the order in which they are given), left the Victoria station, Manchester, at its proper time, 12.10 p.m. On arriving at the Canal junction, about 2.30 p.m., it was 10 or 12 minutes late, owing to the weight of the train and its being delayed at the stations.

The signal for what is named "No. 1 line, west bay," Leeds, was lowered for the passenger train to pass, and it ran through the junction at a speed variously estimated from 3 to 12 miles per hour.

When the engine reached the junction points, it ran along the line which leads to No. 3 main line platform. The two carriages next to it were pulled off the rails, and the remainder of the train went along the rails which lead to No. 1 west bay platform, where the whole of the train was intended to go. The train was pulled up immediately, and came to a stand 80 yards from the junction crossing.

The evidence of the signalman, of the inspector of permanent way, of the engine-driver, and of the second ganger, who is in charge of the points, is not satisfactory; they do not coincide with each other as to the state of the permanent way and of the points immediately after the accident. The signalman asserted that the right-hand point was marked, the left-hand point rail bent, the heel-chair broken, one connecting-rod strained, and that the right-hand point remained about a quarter of an inch open after the accident. The engine driver stated that he could see nothing the matter with the points or rails adjacent when he examined them after the accident. The permanent-way inspector stated that the points fitted properly, that one connecting-rod was strained; and

that the heel-chair of the left-hand point and the slide-chair next to it were broken. The evidence of the second ganger agreed mainly with the permanent-way inspector's, except in regard to the particular connecting-rod that was strained. One of these rods by which the points are worked had evidently been in the fire since the accident, but the permanent-way inspector knew nothing about it, whereas the second ganger admitted that it had been put in the fire in order to thicken and fit the studs and lengthen the rod, as it fitted into the stud holes rather loosely.

The ganger in charge was not present, as he has been dismissed from the company's service for drunkenness since the accident.

On examining the locking apparatus at the canal junction, I found that the locking did not fit closely, and that the west bay line junction-signal could be lowered whilst the junction point lever was out of the notch. Taking into consideration this, and the whole of the evidence, I am of opinion that the junction-points cannot have been in the proper position for No. 1 west bay line, along which the passenger train was intended to run, when the engine of that train reached them. The day is reported to have been very hot. The extension of the rods by heat would have a tendency to push the right-hand point open, particularly if the lever by which it is held was not placed in the notch. Whether it was so or not, I cannot ascertain; but it is certain that the engine could not have gone along No. 3 line, and the train along No. 1 line, if the points had been fixed in their proper position when the engine reached them. The vibration of the engine in passing through the points possibly closed them sufficiently for the hinder part of the train to go along No. 1 west bay line. The engine appears to have split the points, and by breaking the heel-chair of the left point rail and the slide chair next to it, to have got all its wheels on to No. 3 line. The facing points are about 75 yards from the junction cabin, and they are not provided with a locking-bar or locking-bolt. Between the canal junction and the west end of Leeds station there is one set of facing points on the up main-line, three on the down main-line, two on the up line to the bays, and three on the down line from the bays. It is desirable that all these points should be provided with locking-bars, if they cannot be dispensed with.

On observing two engines and trains passing over the points where the accident happened (which are